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APPORTIONMENTOFTHEFEDEMLESTATETAXINTHE
ABSENCE OF STATUTE OR AN EXPRESSION OF
INTENTION

William P. Sutter*
HE federal estate tax is often spoken of as a tax upon the privilege
of transmitting property at death. To the layman this would
appear to mean that he must pay, presumably out of funds in his estate,
for the privilege of leaving that estate to his heirs or other beneficiaries.
This is true enough, so far as it goes, but it does not go far enough.
The federal estate tax is imposed on the transmittal of many kinds of
property which the layman would not ordinarily think of as part of
his estate. Thus, insurance, jointly held property, property over which
a power of appointment is held, property transferred by gifts in contemplation of death, property placed in inter vivas trusts, etc., may all
be included in a decedent's gross taxable estate under certain circumstances.
Because these types of property are often not regarded by decedents
as a part of their taxable estate, they are often overlooked when provisions are made for the payment of estate taxes. In other words, while
the average decedent may be well aware of the fact that his estate
must pay a tax on transmittal of the property comprising it, he does not
think of certain property which finds its way into the tax mill as "estate"
property at all, and, of course, in the usual probate sense it is not part
of the estate.
Now, with respect to property which comprises what is usually
considered to be a decedent's "estate," the almost universal rule requires that it bear the burden of federal estate taxation equally, if the
decedent died intestate, and that his residuary estate bear the burden
where he died testate. The sense of this general rule is readily apparent.
In the case of an intestate decedent, there is no valid reason why any
part of his property should be freed from paying its fair share of federal
estate taxes. On the other hand, where there are specific bequests set
forth in a will, it makes sense to assume that the testator intended them
to represent precisely what his specific legatees should receive, and
that he intended his residuary estate to be just that, a true residue of
whatever was left after payment of all claims, including federal estate
taxes. Of course, a testator may express a contrary intention in his will
and such intention will then control.
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The problem which I intend to discuss arises with respect to the
property not a part of the decedent's "estate" in the usual sense. When
a decedent, often unaware of the fact that it will be included in his estate
for tax purposes, makes no provision in his will for the payment of estate
taxes attributable to such property, ought his general residuary estate
be required to bear the burden of such taxes as it bears the burden of
taxes attributable to specific bequests? Or should such property carry its
own load? The question presently arises most often regarding inter
vivos transfers in trust and gifts in contemplation of death, but it is
equally applicable to the other types of property not a part of the socalled "true estate:"
Federal law now provides in sections 826 (c) and (d) of the Internal Revenue Code that life insurance and property transferred by appointment shall bear their proportionate tax burden. It does not contain similar provisions with respect to other types of non-probate property. At the present time, twenty states provide by statute for some sort
of apportionment of estate taxes.1 Two states have statutes restricting
apportionment in some degree. 2 In the rest, the matter rests in the discretion of the courts. I propose to discuss in this article the situation in
those areas where no statutory guidance exists.

I. The "General" Rule in the Early Cases
It is stated in 15 A L. R. (2d) 1216 at 1220 (1951), that
"In the absence of (I) a controlling statute to the contrary or
(2) some expression of contrary intention on the part of the
1 Arkansas: Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) §63-150; California: Cal. Probate Code (Deering
1949) §§970 to 977, Div. ill, c. XV, art. 4a; Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) tit.
15, c. 102, §§2075 to 2081 and Conn. Gen. Stat. (1951 Supp.) tit. 15, c. 102, §449b;
Delaware: Del. Laws of 1949, c. 405; Florida: Fla. Stat. Ann. (1944, 1951 Supp.)
§734.041; Kansas: Kan. Gen. Stat. (1949) c. 79, art. 15, §79-150lb; Maryland: Md.
Ann. Code (1939) art. 81, §126, as reenacted by Md. Laws of 1947, c. 156; Massachusetts:
Mass. Laws Ann. (1951 Supp.) c. 65A, §§5-5B; Nebraska: Neb. Laws of 1949, c. 222;
New Hampshire: N. H. Rev. Stat. (1942) c. SSA, §§1-3 as added by N. H. Laws
of 1943, c. 175, as amended by N. H. Laws of 1947, c. 102 and N. H. Laws of
1950, c. 5, Part 8, §49; New Jersey: N. J. Stat. (1951) tit. 3A, §§25-30 to 25-38;
New York: N. Y. Decedent Est. Law (McKinney, 1951 Supp.) art. 4, §124; North
Dakota: N. D. Rev. Code (1943) §57-3723; Oregon: Ore. Laws of 1949, c. 475, §2, as
amended by Ore. Laws of 1951, c. 386; Pennsylvania: Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1951
Supp.) tit. 20, §§881 to 887; Rhode Island: R. I. Gen. Laws of 1938, c. 43, §33, as
amended by R. I. Acts and Resolves of 1939, c. 664, §1; Tennessee: Tenn. Code (1951
Supp.) art. XX, §§8350.7 to 8350.9 eff. Feb. 11, 1943; Texas: Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon,
1952) tit. 54, c. 27, art. 3683a; Virginia: Va. Code (1950) art. 7, §§64-150 to 64-155.
In Maine, chapter 269 of the Laws of 1945 provided for apportionment but was repealed
by chapter 220 of the Laws of 1947, which protects rights acquired while the previous
statute was in force.
2 Alabama: Ala. Acts of 1951, act. 291, eff. July 26, 1951; Minnesota: Minn. Stat.
Ann. (1945) §291.40, as amended by Minn. Laws of 1951, c. 249, eff. April 7, 1951.

1952]

APPORTIONMENT OF FEDERAL EsTATE TAXES

55

decedent, it is generally held that the burden of estate taxes imposed upon inter vivos transfers made by the decedent must fall
upon his residuary estate."
This statement, which I believe to be too strongly worded, has
nonetheless a great deal of justification. It will be noted that chapter 3
of the Internal Revenue Code labels the federal tax an "Estate Tax,"
and that section 826(b) of the Code provides in part that"... so far
as is practicable and unless otherwise directed by the will of the decedent the tax shall be paid out of the estate before its distribution."
Comparable provisions have existed in the federal estate tax law since
its inception. These facts, together with the concept of an "estate tax"
as a tax upon the privilege of transmitting property, not upon the privilege of receiving it, underlie the principle that the residuary estate
should free specific bequests from tax. Strangely, although the rule as
it affects testamentary probate property may be easily defended on
grounds of a testator's implied intent, it has seldom been so explained,
courts preferring to rely upon a federal "intent" which they have found
in the above quoted language.
· This burden-on-the-residue principle, rational enough in operation
even if not explained on a theory of implied intent, after developing in
situations involving specific bequests, was gradually extended to nontestamentary and non-probate property. The expansion of the concept
is readily observable.
The first important case involving apportionment of federal estate
taxes was one where the conflict lay between specific and residuary
legatees. New York, in In re Hamlin,3 held that the residuary estate
must pay the entire tax. The court reviewed the wording of the federal statute and the committee reports, both of which showed the tax
to be an estate tax as distinct from an inheritance tax, the latter being
a tax on receiving property, the former on transmitting it, and then concluded,
"When the Congress provided that the tax was imposed upon
the value of the net estate, the manner in which said value should
be determined, and that the executor should pay the tax, and . . .
said 'it being the purpose and intent of this title that so far as is
practicable and unless otherwise directed by the will of the decedent the tax shall be paid out of the estate before its distribution,'
the conclusion is inevitable that the tax was not imposed on lega-

3226 N.Y. 407, 124 N.E. 4 (1919), cert. den. 250 U.S. 672, 40 S.Ct. 14 (1919).
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cies, the tax to be paid by the legatees rather than by the executor
out of the estate before distribution." 4

In the same year, the Massachusetts court had occasion to decide
the same question-should there be apportionment between specific
legatees and residuary legatees? In Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co./'
apportionment lost. That court, too, looked at the nature of the tax
and the wording of the federal statute. It cited the Hamlin decision and
concluded that the law"... leaves it [the tax] simply to be paid out of
the estate before distribution is made." 6 This made the federal estate
tax something of a charge upon the estate, and
"It is the general rule that, failing any testamentary provision
to the contrary, debts, charges and all just obligations upon an
estate must be paid out of the residue of an estate.... The tax is• a
pecuniary burden or imposition laid upon the estate. . . . Since
neither the act of Congress nor the will and codicils make any
other provision for the point of ultimate incidence of this tax, it
must rest on the residue of the estate."7
Ohio, too, had to settle a dispute between specific legatees and a
residuary legatee, and lined up with New York and Massachusetts.
Y.M.C.A. v. Davis8 involved a residuary legatee which was a charity.
The contention was made that to require the residuary estate to pay the
federal estate tax would be subjecting a charitable bequest to taxation
from which it was exempt. The Ohio court, like those of New York and
Massachusetts, studied the nature of the tax, relied heavily upon the
wording of the federal statute as placing the burden upon the residuary
estate, and cited the Hamlin and Plunkett decisions. The Supreme
Court of the United States, affirming, relied upon the nature of the
tax and held that to require the residuary legatees to bear the burden
of the tax was not an invalid taxation of charities.
At about the same time that Ohio was adopting the burden--on-theresidue rule as applied to conflicts between residuary and specific legatees, Massachusetts and New York were taking the next step. Massachusetts led the way, deciding Bemis v. Converse9 in 1923. In that case
the question was whether the residuary estate should bear the burden
of taxes imposed not upon specific bequests but upon property which
had been previously transferred by the decedent to certain inter vivos
4Jd. at 418.
IS 233 Mass. 471, 124 N.E. 265 (1919).
6Jd. at 475.
1 Id. at 475-476.
.
s 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E. 114 (1922), affd. 264 U.S. 47, 44 S.Ct. 291 (1924).
9 246 Mass. 131, 140 N.E. 686 (1923).
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trusts. The Massachusetts court held that it should. It looked to the
wording of the federal estate tax law and stressed the presence therein
of a section providing for apportionment of estate taxes arising from
the inclusion of life insurance in a decedent's taxable estate.10 With
regard to this section, the court stated: "The presence of this provision
indicates that no other apportionment was intended by Congress."11
This being the case, it then concluded:
"Courts cannot speculate concerning the intention of settlors
and testators as to where they intend the burden of taxes to rest.
The instrument as written must govern. . . . Specific provision on
this point is familiar in wills and is not infrequently found in other
instruments. In the absence of a definite declaration on the subject
it must be presumed that the intention was that the ultimate weight
of taxation must rest where the law places it."12
The following year New York adopted the same view in one of the
most widely cited of all the early decisions. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.
v. Winthrop,1 3 decided in 1924 by the New York Court of Appeals,
held against apportionment of federal estate taxes imposed by reason
of certain inter vivas trusts. The court relied upon the federal statute
to hold that Congress had "explicitly" placed the burden upon the decedent's residuary estate. The court also placed its faith in the Hamlin,
Bemis and Y.M.C.A. decisions, only one of which had to do with
apportionment as it affected inter vivas trusts.
The development of the non-apportionment doctrine was not limited
to the East, however, and Central Trust Co. v. Burrows1 4 in Kansas
appears as one of the leading authorities for putting the burden on the
residuary legatees. Gifts in contemplation of death were involved in
that case and the court stated that"... whether just or unjust, the federal law laid the tax on the Burrow estate."15 The court relied heavily
upon the Plunkett, Hamlin, Farmers Loan & Trust Co. and Y.M.C.A.
holdings, quoting the latter two as to the effect of the federal statute.
This decision did indicate, however, a view that the states had power to
change the burden of the tax from where it was placed by federal law,
but only by statute.
. One or more of these six cases, the most widely cited in this field,
were thereafter referred to and approved in decisions in Arkansas, Cali10 Now sec. 826(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.
11 Bemis v. Converse, 246 Mass. 131 at 134, 140 N.E.
12 Id. at 134.

1s 238 N.Y. 488, 144 N.E. 769 (1924).
14

144 Kan. 79, 58 P.(2d) 469 (1936).

15Id. at 80.

686 (1923).
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fornia, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Tennessee.16
In most of the decisions in those states, too, great emphasis was placed
upon the wording of the federal tax statute. In New Hampshire, indeed, a line of cases requiring apportionment was overruled, at least in
part because of the "... binding effect upon the state courts of this
interpretation of the federal tax." 17

IL The Opposing Viewpoint
Despite this imposing array of decisions denying apportionment,
several states refused to burden the residuary estate with taxes which
should "equitably" be borne by other property. Thus, in Kentucky,
apportionment was established as the rule in the early case of Hampton's Admrs. v. Hampton18 wherein the court stated,
"Considering the act as a whole ... we cannot escape the conclusion that Congress did not intend to discriminate between the
widow, heirs and distributees, but intended that every portion of
the estate should bear its proportionate part of the tax, subject,
however, to the right of the decedent to provide by will out of
what portion of his estate the tax should be paid."

In Florida, Henderson v. Usher1 9 determined that a widow's dower
should pay its proportionate part of estate taxes, the court finding that
contribution was required both by local statute and by equitable considerations. Equitable principles were also relied upon by the Supreme
Court of Georgia in requiring apportionment in the case of Regents of
University System v. Trust Co. of Georgia. 20
There were, then, a few jurisdictions wherein apportionment had
been judicially established at the time when the Supreme Court of the
United States handed duwn its decision in the tremendously important
case of Riggs v. Del Drago. 21 Such jurisdictions, however, were decidedly in the minority.
I6Thompson v. Union & Mercantile Trust Co., 164 Ark. 411, 262 S.W. 324 (1924);
Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Older, 50 Cal. App. (2d) 724, 123 P. (2d)
873 (1942); Ericson v. Childs, 124 Conn. 66, 198 A. 176 (1938); Amoskeag Trust Co.
v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 89 N.H. 471, 200 A. 786 (1938); Ely's Estate, 28 Pa.
D. & C. 663 (1936); Uber's Estate, 29 Pa. D. & C. 341 (1937); and Hutchison v. Montgomery, 172 Tenn. 375, 112 S.W. (2d) 827 (1938).
17 Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 89 N.H. 471 at 473.
It is interesting, too, that the court in Ely's Estate refused to follow two earlier cases
requiring apportionment because they were against the weight of authority, although
it conceded that the apportionment approach "is undoubtedly the fair one."
1s 188 Ky. 199 at 202, 221 S.W. 496 (1920). Martin v. Martin's Admr., 283 Ky.
513, 142 S.W.(2d) 164 (1940), expressly reaffirmed this principle.
10125 Fla. 709, 170 S. 846 (1936).
20 194 Ga. 255, 21 S.E.(2d) 691 (1942) .
.21317 U.S. 95, 63 S.Ct. 109 (1942).
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III. The Del Drago Case and its Effect
The State of New York, where Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Winthrop22 had early established the rule against apportionment of federal
estate taxes, adopted a statute overthrowing the rule and requiring apportionment where a decedent did not provide against it.23 The New
York Court of Appeals held the statute unconstitutional on the ground
that section 826(b) of the Internal Revenue Code required the burden
of the federal estate tax to be placed on a decedent's residuary estate
unless he directed differently. 24 In this position, the court was supported by much language in the Hamlin, Farmers Loan & Trust Co.
and Bemis decisions. 25 Since federal law provided where the burden of
the federal tax should fall, the New York court held, state law was
powerless to change the impact of the tax.
The United States Supreme Court held the New York statute constitutional, saying, "... Congress intended that state law should determine the ultimate thrust of the tax." 26
The effect of this decision, it is apparent, was to weaken the
force of the earlier cases which had refused to permit apportionment
wholly or in part because of the wording of the federal estate tax statute. Thus, when Kentucky was urged to overrule its decision in the
case of Hampton's Admrs. v. Hampton27 and to adopt the majority position against apportionment, the court, in Trimble v. Hatcher's Exrs., 28
said,
"It is recognized at the outset that the opinions of many courts,
and relied upon by gift recipients, hold that in the absence of a
state statute or provisions of the will providing allocation otherwise, the ultimate burden of federal estate tax falls and remains
where the federal statute, as claimed, places it, upon the estate,
or as some of the opinions hold, upon the residue."
After citing a number of the early cases to this effect, the court continued,
N.Y. 488, 144 N.E. 769 (1924).
124 of the Decedent Estate Law, c. 709, Laws of 1930.
24 Matter of Del Drago, 287 N.Y. 61, 38 N.E.(2d) 131 (1941).
25 Jn re Hamlin, 226 N.Y. 407, 124 N.E. 4 (1919), cert. den. 250 U.S. 672 (1919);
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N.Y. 488, 144 N.E. 769 (1924); Bemis v.
Converse, 246 Mass. 131, 140 N.E. 686 (1923).
26Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 at 98, 63 S.Ct. 109 (1942).
27 188 Ky. 199, 221 S.W. 496 (1920).
2s 295 Ky. 178 at 182, 173 S.W.(2d) 985 (1943), cert. den. 321 U.S. 747 (1944).
The decision has been approved in Dawson v. Gaines, 299 Ky. 100, 184 S.W.(2d)
894 (1945); and Louisville Trust Co. v. Walter, 306 Ky. 756, 207 S.W.(2d) 328 (1948).
See also Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Huber, (Ky. 1951) 240 S.W.(2d) 89.
22 238
28 Sec.
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"... we cannot refrain from observing that in the recent case
of Riggs v. Del Drago ... the Supreme Court apparently dispelled
the notion that the federal trucing law should be construed as placing the tax estate on the residue of the estate."29
Thereupon, it reaffirmed the "most equitable rule" of the earlier
Kentucky decisions, concluding,
"... the federal estate tax is not a tax against the estate, save and
except that it must be paid therefrom, for the benefit and convenience of the trucing authorities."30
In Rhode Island, Hooker v. Drayton,81 a widely cited case involving property passing under a power of appointment (now governed by
section 826(d) of the Internal Revenue Code), stressed the effect of
the Del Drago decision. The court required appointed property to pay
its proportionate part of the federal estate tax, and stated its belief that
In re Hamlin and Bemis v. Converse were wrongly decided because of
an erroneous understanding of the effect of the federal statute. The
Del Drago case, it said, made it clear that state law should be the controlling factor in determining the burden of estate taxes, and it set forth
the Rhode Island law in the following terms:
"It is true that the rule here is, as it is generally, that, in the
absence of a contrary testamentary direction, the burden of all debts,
charges and obligations falls upon the residue of the estate. . . .
But the rule as thus stated is applicable only to the true estate of
the testator within the meaning of our law of property."32

It then held that property passing under a power of appointment was
not part of the decedent's "true estate," so that his residuary estate was
not required to pay the estate tax attributable thereto.
In 1950, in the case of Industrial Trust Co. v. Budlong,33 Rhode
Island extended the principles of the Hooker decision to inter vivos
trusts subjected to federal estate taxation. The court refused to follow the
early cases denying apportionment as well as a recent Minnesota decision,34 preferring the language of its own earlier decision with respect
to the "true estate" of a decedent, and saying:
"Such true estate comprises merely that property which actually
passes directly from the testator, either by operation of the law of this
state or under his will, and does not include property contained
20295 Ky. 178 at 183.
so Id. at 186.
31 69 R.I. 290, 33 A.(2d) 206
32 Id. at 295.
88 (R.I. 1950) 76 A,(2d) 600.

M

(1943).

Gelin v. Gelin, ,229 Minn. 516, 40 N.W.(2d) 342 (1949).
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in a separate irrevocable inter vivos trust as here or property passing by virtue of an exercise of a power of appointment as in the
Hooker case....
'We recognize that the weight of authority, broadly speaking,
is contra to the law as laid down in the Hooker case, but we are of
the opinion that in the long run the law as therein established will
lead to more equitable results in directing the impact of the federal
estate tax. It may also be noted that the decision in Regents of
University System of Georgia v. Trust Co. of Georgia ... was to
the same general effect as that in the Hooker case."35
The question of apportionment of federal estate taxes imposed by
reason of jointly held property was recently before an Indiana court,
the £rst such problem to arise in that state.. In Pearcy v. Citizens Bank
& Trust Co. of Bloomington36 an Indiana appellate court required apportionment although it recognized that many cases were to the contrary. The court said, "... we are of the opinion they are based on
an erroneous concept of the Federal Estate Tax Act."37
In its opinion, the court quoted at length from Hooker v. Drayton
and expressed its approval of the Kentucky, Florida, and Georgia
cases,38 as well as Succession of Ratcliff-39 in Louisiana. It indicated its
acceptance of the maxim, "equality is equity," and again stated that the
non-apportionment cases were based upon "... an erroneous concept
of the Federal Estate Tax Act and a misinterpretation of the provisions
thereof."40
It should also be noted that New York, although the situation there
is now governed by an apportionment statute,41 has indicated that, if
the common law were still in force, it might reverse its previous position and require apportionment. In re Gato's Estate42 dealt with the
35 Industrial

Trust Co. v. Budlong, (R.I. 1950) 76 A. (2d) 600 at 605.
121 Ind. App. 136, 96 N.E.(2d) 918 (1951), reh. den. 121 Ind. App. 136,
98 N.E.(2d) 231 (1951).
87 Id. at 148.
88 Hampton's Achnrs. v. Hampton, 188 Ky. 199, 221 S.W. 496 (1920); Martin
v. Martin's Admr., 283 Ky. 513, 142 S.W.(2d) 164 (1940); Henderson v. Usher, 125
Fla. 709, 170 S. 846 (1936); and Regents of University System v. Trust Co. of Georgia,
194 Ga. 255, 21 S.E.(2d) 691 (1942).
89 212 La. 563, 33 S.(2d) 114 (1947). This case held that a widow's community
property must bear its share of federal estate taxes. The court cited the Del Drago decision
and applied local law. Since Louisiana had no statute governing the thrust of federal
estate taxes, the court employed "equitable principles" to require such property to pay
its proportionate part of the federal tax, community property constituting part of the
deceased spouse's taxable estate under the 1942 Revenue Act.
40 Pearcy v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Bloomington, 121 Ind. App. 136 at
157, 96 N.E.(2d) 918 (1951) reh. den. 121 Ind. App. 136, 98 N.E.(2d) 231 (1951).
41 N.Y. Decedent Estate Law (McKinney, 1951 Supp.) art. 4, § 124.
42276 App. Div. 651, 97 N.Y.S. (2d) 171 (1950), affd. 301 N.Y. 653, 93 N.E.(2d)
924 (1950).
36
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Florida apportionment statute.43 The court found it necessary to decide
whether that statute attempted a retroactive change in the Florida law
which would make it unconstitutional. It held, however, that Florida
law had not been changed by the passage of the apportionment act, because in section 5 thereof the Florida legislature stated that the "equitable principles" of the act were "merely declaratory of the existing public policy."44 Moreover, said the court, Henderson v. Usher45 demonstrated that the common law of Florida provided for apportionment,
and, "the pre-existing law and policy of Florida, as declared by its Legislature, which finds support in the indicated cases, is in line with the
law ~d policy of other States."46 Then, although the comment was
purely gratuitous, the court recognized that New York had held at
common law that apportionment was not permissible in the absence of
an express direction to that effect by the decedent~ Citing the Del
Drago decision,47 it concluded,
''The result was not only to sustain section 124 of the Decedent Estate Law but also to nullify the prior New York decisions,
such as the Hamlin, Winthrop and Oakes cases heretofore cited,
which held that the residue must bear the impact of the Federal
estate taxes because of the supposed Congressional direction."48
Similarly, in Pennsylvania, doubt has recently been cast upon the
validity of earlier decisions denying apportionment.49 Pennsylvania,
like New York, has not been required to change the common law rule
against apportionment by court decision because it now operates under
an apportionment statute,50 but language appearing in Mellon Estate,5 1
Jones' Estate52 and Knight Estate53 is interesting.
43 Fla. Stat. Ann. §734.041, added by Laws of 1949, c. 25435, §1-4.
44 Id., §734.041, note.
45 125 Fla. 709, 170 S. 846 (1936).
46 In re Gato's Estate, 276 App. Div. 651 at 656, 97 N.Y.S. (2d) l 71 (1950), affd.
301 N.Y. 653, 93 N.E.(2d) 924 (1950). The Florida Supreme Court, in Hagerty v.
Hagerty, (Fla. 1951) 52 S. (2d) 432, stated at 435, "The principle of apportionment
was recognized by us in Henderson v. Usher ••• and by the legislature later in Section
734.041 •.••"
47Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 63 S.Ct. 109 (1942).
48 In re Gato's Estate, 276 App. Div. 651 at 656, 97 N.Y.S. (2d) 171 (1950),
affd. 301 N.Y. 653, 93 N.E. (2d) 924 (1950). Similarly, in In re Comer's Trust,
101 N.Y.S. (2d) 916 (Supr. Ct. N.Y.C. 1950), a New-York court required apportionment
of federal estate taxes imposed by reason of certain inter vivos trusts in Georgia, relying
on the common law authority of Regents of University System v. Trust Co. of Georgia,
194 Ga. 255, 21 S.E. (2d) 691 (1942). In passing, the court made the statement that
the old New York rule on apportionment had been "modified," citing In re Gato's
Estate, supra.
49Ely's Estate, 28 Pa. D & C. 663 (1936); Uber's Estate, 29 Pa. D. & C. 341 (1937).
50 Act 338, Laws of 1951, is the current Pennsylvania statute,
51 347 Pa. 520, 32 A. (2d) 749 (1943).
52 54 Pa. D. & C. 364 (1945).
53 66 Pa. D. & C. 267 (1949).

•
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In the first of these, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in upholding
the then apportionment statute in a case involving apportionment of
estate taxes on gifts in contemplation of death, stated that it was not
necessarily true that there would be no apportionment without the
statute.
"The eguitable principle of contribution has long been enforced in this Commonwealth on principles of natural justice.
. . . We are aware that certain lower court decisions in this Commonwealth have cast doubt upon the right of contribution for
estate taxes paid by one of several persons jointly liable. We believe that the reasoning in these cases is unsound...."54
And, answering a contention that the apportionment statute destroyed
vested rights, the court in Jones' Estate said:
"Exceptant's argument assumes that but for some statutory
authority proration would be legally impossible. Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania show that assumption to be unwarranted. In both Mellon Estate ... and Moreland
Estate, 351 Pa. 623 (1945), it is recognized that the doctrine of
equitable contribution applies and is enforcible by the orphans'
court quite apart from any statute.... Ely's Estate, 28 D. & C. 663
(1936), cited by exceptant as authority that proration is not available in the absence of statute, must be taken as overruled by the
Mellon and Moreland cases. While not mentioned by name,
doubtless Ely's Estate was one of lower court decisions referred to
in Mellon Estate ... which 'have cast doubt upon the right of
contribution for estate taxes', and the reasoning in which is rejected as unsound." 55
Finally, the court in Knight Estate, holding that the apportionment
statute did not create the only possible procedure for obtaining contribution for estate taxes, stated that there is an equitable contribution for
"estate taxes paid by an executor out of a testamentary estate but which
another trust estate in justice or equity should pay in part." These
post-Del Drago decisions by Pennsylvania courts do not refer to that
case, proceeding instead upon the assumption that apportionment has
always been available in Pennsylvania equity.
Perhaps the most important state which has recently adopted a
rule requiring apportionment, however, is Ohio, which did so in 1952.
It must be remembered that Ohio, in the Y.M.C.A. decision,5 6 was one
of the first states to place the burden of estate taxes upon the residuary
54 Mellon Estate, 347 Pa. 520 at 535-536, 32 A. (2d) 749 (1943).
55 54 Pa. D. & C. 364 at 368-369 (1945).
56 Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E. II4 (1922),

47 (1924).

affd. 264 U.S.
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estate. It is true that that early case involved a dispute between specific
and residuary legatees, but the decision has been widely cited in antiapportionment jurisdictions as holding against apportionment in all
instances. Then, in Miller v. Hammond, 61 the Ohio Supreme Court
held that a widow who renounced her husband's will and took her
statutory share was entitled to receive it free of any burden of federal
estate tax, because it did not cause the imposition of that tax, being
entitled to the marital deduction. The court distinguished the Y.M.
C.A. holding on the facts, and did not discuss the widespread conllict of
authority regarding apportionment. It simply cited the Budlong decision in Rhode Island,68 a decision requiring apportionment of federal
estate taxes caused in part by certain inter vivas trusts, and said,
"That holding, in our opinion, discloses a proper application
of equitable principles for the purpose of preventing injustice to
some heirs and unjustified windfalls to others. The rule suggested
by the cases cited, and the cases referred to therein, may be summarized as follows: In the absence of a testamentary direction to
the contrary the federal estate tax on all the property within the
testamentary estate will be paid from the residue while all nontestamentary interests will bear only the burden of estate taxes attributed to them." 59
A short time after reaching this decision, the Ohio Supreme Court
was confronted with a case involving an inter vivas trust. In McDougall v. Central National Bank of Cleveland,60 Judge Taft, who had
dissented in the Miller case, wrote the opinion decreeing apportionment.
He recognized the conllict of authority on this question, as well as the
existence of apportionment statutes in some 15 states. He then pointed
out that the early cases which had held against apportionment had done
so in large part due to a presumed congressional intent, citing many of
the decisions referred to above. This presumed intent, he continued,
had been shown not to exist in the Del Drago decision, despite which
fact two states61 had since decided against apportionment, "either by
assuming to follow the earlier cases or the weight of authority." Five
states, on the other hand, he said, had taken the other view.62 Then,
57 156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E. (2d) 9 (1952).
5s Industrial Trust Co. v. Budlong, CR.I. 1950) 76 A. (2d) 600.
59 Miller v. Hammond, 156 Ohio St. 475 at 493, 104 N.E. (2d) 9

(1952).
157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E. (2d) 441 (1952).
a1 Minnesota and Washington. See Gelin v. Gelin, 229 Minn. 516, 40 N.W. (2d)
342 (1949); Seattle-First Nat. Bank v. Macomber, 32 Wash. (2d) 696, 203 P. (2d)
1078 (1949).
62 Rhode Island: Industrial Trust Co. v. Budlong, (R.I. 1950) 76 A. (2d) 600;
Georgia: Regents of University System v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 194 Ga. 255, 21 S.E. (2d)
691 (1942); Florida: Gato's Estate, 276 App. Div. 651, 97 N.Y.S. (2d) 171 (1950), affd.
301 N.Y. 653, 93 N.E. (2d) 924 (1950); Louisiana: Succession of Ratcliff, 212 _La. 563,
60
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having indicated the two opposing camps, Judge Taft declined to select either on its merit, saying simply, "... this court in Miller et al.,
Ex'rs v. Hammond 1952, 156 Ohio S. 475 ... expressly approved equitable apportionment of the federal estate tax." 63
He admitted that he had written a dissenting opinion in that case,
and had cited authority to the effect that the weight of the decided cases
was against apportionment. However, he stated, his dissent was in
reality based upon his construction of the Ohio statutes of descent and
upon his interpretation of the expressed will of the testator. He found
it difficult to understand the justice of a rule of law which would deny
apportionment, and pointed out that Ohio had often recognized equitable apportionment in other situations. He cited the syllabus of opinion in the Y.M.C.A. case, wherein it was stated that the court had held
that the charges imposed by the federal estate tax "must first be paid
out of the estate as a whole." This, Judge Taft stated, indicated that
the estate tax was a burden on the entire estate, including the trust
assets in the present instance.
He concluded by finding that there was no expressed or implied
direction against apportionment in the case at hand, which was not the
case in the situation which prevailed in the Y.M.C.A. case, where only
testamentary assets were involved and the charity was specifically
directed to take only the residue.
While these two recent Ohio decisions leave something to be desired as to straightforwardness, that is perhaps to be expected when a
court decides to adopt a position contrary to that which it had been
believed to hold for 30 years. The fact that the Ohio Supreme Court
did so at all indicates the growing vigor of the apportionment concept.

IV. Modern Cases Denying Apportionment
The trend in the courts, even in recent years, has not been entirely
favorable to apportionment, however, as Judge Taft of Ohio recognized.
As recently as 1950, Massachusetts reaffirmed its common law rule as
expressed in the Plunkett and Bemis cases.64 The case doing so, Isaacson v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,65 has been criticized66 but
inasmuch as Massachusetts is now operating under an apportionment
33 S. (2d) 114 (1947); and Kentucky: Trimble v. Hatcher's Exrs., 295 Ky. 178, 173 S.W.
(2d) 985 (1943), cert. den. 321 U.S. 747, 64 S.Ct. 611 (1944).
63 McDougall v. Central National Bank of Cleveland, 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.
(2d) 441 at 444 (1952).
64 Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 124 N.E. 265 (1919); Bemis
v. Converse, 246 Mass. 131, 140 N.E. 686 (1923).
65 325 Mass. 469, 91 N.E. (2d) 334 (1950).
66 30 BosT. UNIV. L. REv. 449 (1950) argues that the court should have taken cogni7ance of Riggs v. Del Drago as changing the common law.
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statute,67 the common law rule is unlikely to be changed by court decision.
Several New Jersey decisions have indicated that state's adherence
to the non-apportionment rule, it being stated in Brauburger 17. Sheridan68 that, "... in the absence of a controlling statute or of a contrary
testamentary direction, the full burden of federal estate taxes has been
determined to fall upon the residuary estate of the testator." The court
cited in support of this position a series of pre-Del Drago decisions, most
of which relied, at least in part, upon the effect of the wording of the
federal estate tax statute. It conceded that the rule denying apportionment was inequitable and was not in accord with the Hooker case in
Rhode Island.69 Nonetheless, out of the cited cases in other jurisdictio~s, and a large number of pre- and post-Del Drago decisions in New
Jersey ( which had, however, generally found an express denial of
apportionment in the words of the decedent), the court developed its
principle:
"... the federal estate tax is imposed on the devolution of
property from a decedent at and by reason of his death and unless
otherwise governed by statute or by the directions of the decedent's
will, it is payable out of the decedent's residuary estate." 70
The New Jersey court did not discuss the effect, if any, of the Del
Drago decision71 upon this doctrine, although it cited that case. It
should be noted that New Jersey, too, now has an apportionment
statute. 72
A federal decision in 1943, construing California law, contained
the statement:
"The general rule, when the law of the state does not provide otherwise, is that this burden rests, like other administration expenses, on the general estate and is not apportioned among
the legatees. . . . This rule is recognized in California. In re
Estate of Miller, 184 Cal. 674, 678-680, 195 P. 413, 16 A.L.R.
694 ...."73
67 Mass. Laws Ann. (1951 Supp.) c. 65A, §§5-5B.
68 7 N.J. Super 576 at 580, 72 A. (2d) 363 (1950).

See also Hackensack Trust
Co. v. Ackerman, 138 N.J. Eq. 244, 47 A. (2d) 832 (1946). The Brauburger case
was criticized by the Indiana court in Pearcy v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Bloomington,
121 Ind. App. 136, 96 N.E. (2d) 918 (1951), reh. den. 121 Ind. App. 136, 98 N.E.
(2d) 231 (1951).
69 Hooker v. Drayton, 69 R.I. 290, 33 A. (2d) 206 (1943).
70 Brauburger v. Sheridan, 7 N.J. Super. 576 at 582, 72 A. (2d) 363 (1950). The
principle has been reiterated in First Nat. Bank of Jersey City v. Arlitz, (N.J. Super.
1950) C.C.H. State Inher. Tax Rep. ,r17,155, and Pfaltz v. Somerby, (N.J. Super. 1950)
C.C.H. State Inher. Tax Rep. ,rl 7,282.
11 Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 63 S.Ct. 109 (1942).
12 N.J. Stat. (1951) tit. 3A, §§25-30 to 25-38.
73 Rogan v. Taylor, (9th Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 598 at 600. See also, Est. of Hotaling,
74 Cal. App. (2d) 898, 170 P. (2d) 111 (1946).
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And in Arkansas, now controlled by an apportionment act,74 a 1947
case stated that the common law rule in that state was against apportionment.75
In 1949, considering the question for the first time, the Minnesota
Supreme Court arrived at the conclusion that there should be no apportionment in a case involving jointly held property. In Gelin 11.
Gelin,76 it stated:
"In other jurisdictions, the majority of courts have held that
the federal estate tax burden is properly a charge against and
payable from the residue of an estate, and that no portion thereof
shall be assessed against property specifically devised unless the
residue is insufficient to pay such tax."
The court recognized that Kentucky holds the opposite view and concluded,
"It is true that most of the decisions relied upon in support of
the majority rule were made prior to Riggs v. Del Drago, supra.
However, since that decision, courts passing upon this question
have adhered to the majority rule. See, First Nat. Bank v. Hart,
383 Ill. 489, 50 N.E. (2d) 461; Hughes v. Sun L. Assur. Co.
(7 Cir.) 159 F. (2d) llO.
"It is the opinion of this court that the majority rule should
be followed." 77
Washington, too, has recently decided to follow the older rule.
Seattle-First Nat. Banky. Macomber78 dealt with the apportionment
of federal estate taxes imposed by reason of certain inter vivos trusts.
The court first recognized that state law controlled and then cited
115 A. L. R. 917 to the effect that a decedent's residuary estate bears
the burden of estate taxes in the absence of statute or direction. The
opinion referred to the Burrow case in Kansas, 79 noted the limited application of the rule in Rhode Island under the Hooker decision,80 and
commented (incorrectly) that New Jersey was the leading exponent of
"equitable apportionment," which had also been approved in Kentucky
in Trimble v. Hatcher's Exrs. 81 After referring to these other jurisdic74 Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) §63-150.
75 Terral v. Terral, 212 Ark. 221, 205 S.W. (2d) 198
76 229 Minn. 516 at 522, 40 N.W. (2d) 342 (1949).
77 Id. at 522-523.

(1947).

78 32 Wash. (2d) 696, 203 P. (2d) 1078 (1949). This decision was followed in
Est. of Williamson, 38 Wash. (2d) 259, 229 P. (2d) 312 (1951), which also relied on
the nature of an estate tax as "an expense of administration" distinct from an inheritance
tax imposed upon "the taking of property by beneficiaries or devisees."
79 Central Trust Co. v. Burrow, 144 Kan. 79, 58 P. (2d) 469 (1936).
80 Hooker v. Drayton, 69 R.I. 290, 33 A. (2d) 206 (1943).
81295 Ky. 178, 173 S.W. (2d) 985 (1943), cert. den. 321 U.S. 747, 64 S.Ct. 611
(1944).
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tions, the court concluded that it preferred the rule set out in Bemis v.
Converse82 in Massachusetts, to the effect that courts cannot speculate
as to intention and that without guidance they must leave the burden
of estate taxes "where the law places it." The court did not discuss the
effect of the Del Drago decision83 on the Bemis case, although the latter
was specifically referred to by the Supreme Court as an example of
misinterpretation of the federal statute.
Delaware has an apportionment statute.84 In a case arising after
its enactment, but dealing with nontestamentary property which passed
on death prior thereto, it was held that the rights of persons taking nontestamentary property became vested on the death of the decedent. 85
While the court acknowledged that the Del Drago case permitted the
states to provide for apportionment by statute, such a statute, it held,
could not be permitted to defeat vested rights. Since the court found
no testamentary direction for apportionment, it concluded, "The tax
on that property, none of which appears to be tangible, is, therefore,
payable from the residuary estate according to the federal rule." 86
Finally, the cases in Illinois should not be overlooked. While there
are no cases in that jurisdiction which directly pass upon the right of
an executor to recover a pro rata part of the federal estate tax from
the takers of jointly held property, inter vivas transfers, etc., several
old Illinois decisions passed upon the nature of the federal estate
tax. Thus, in People v. Northern Trust Co., 81 the court said,
"The Federal estate tax is a charge or expense against the
estate of the decedent rather than against the share of the legatees
or the distributees, and as part of the expense of administration
this tax should be deducted before computing the State inheritance tax."
This holding dealt with the deductibility of the federal tax, not with its
ultimate thrust, but the court's preoccupation with the nature of the
tax is closely akin to that shown in the early New York and Massachusetts decisions.
Then, in 1943, the Illinois Supreme Court decided First Nat. Bank
of Chicago v. Hart. 88 In that case, the testator's residuary estate had
s2 246 Mass. 131, 140 N.E. 686 (1923).
BS Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 63 S.Ct. 109 (1942).
84 C. 405, Laws of 1949.
85 Equitable Trost Co. v. Richards, (Del. 1950) 73 A. (2d)

437, cited in Delaware
Trust Co. v. Blackstone, (Del. Ch. 1951) 81 A. (2d) 126.
86 (Del. 1950) 73 A. (2d) 437 at 444.
81289 ill. 475 at 477, 124 N.E. 662 (1919); see also People v. Pasfield, 284 ill.
450, 120 N.E. 286 (1918).
ss 383 ill. 489, 50 N.E. (2d) 461 (1943).
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been distributed, pursuant to a power of appointment exercised by his
wife, one-third to each of two children of the testator and one-third to
two children of a deceased child of the testator. The third distributed
to the two grandchildren was subjected to a lower inheritance tax than
the other thirds because of the two exemptions allowed and the lower
tax rate. The testator's will contained no provision with respect to
the payment of estate and inheritance taxes. The executor, having
paid the entire inheritance tax out of the residuary estate, was held
entitled to deduct from the share of each distributee of the residuary
estate the amount of inheritance tax imposed on his or her share. The
two children of the testator then maintained that by paying the larger
inheritance tax they had, in effect, contributed to a larger part of the
80% credit allowed for federal estate tax purposes, had thus "contributed
more to the satisfaction of the common burden," and were, therefore,
entitled to reimbursement from the others equal to the proportionate
amount by which the shares of the others were enhanced by reason of
such payment. This contention was rejected by the court apparently
on the ground that the Illinois tax was to be assessed against the shares
distributed to the several beneficiaries without regard to the 80% credit
allowed against the federal estate tax. However, the court felt called
upon to discuss the incidence of the federal estate tax and, after mentioning the Del Drago case, said:
". . . The court there stated the law to be that the Federal
estate tax should be paid out of the estate as a whole and that the
applicable State law as to the devolution of the property at death
should govern the distribution of the remainder. It is sufficient to
observe, however, that this State has no provision in its laws relating to the incidence of the burden of Federal estate tax and it must
therefore fall directly upon the corpus of the estate and be considered an item of expense, such as debts, funeral expenses, and the
like. The fact that inheritance taxes are allowed as a credit on
Federal estate taxes, does not alter the situation with respect to the
nature and effect of the two taxes. In the absence of statutory
enactment directing otherwise, the Federal tax must be considered
as a charge against the whole of the estate and not against the individual shares (Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95,) unless otherwise specifically directed by the testator. (Young Men's Christian
Association v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47, 68 L. ed 558.)"89
The precise rationale of the Hart case is not entirely clear from a
reading of the court's opinion. The language just cited, however,
89 Id.

at 497.
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would be a difficult hurdle to get over in attempting to persuade the
Illinois courts to adopt the apportionment rule. 90

V. Conclusion
While these recent cases indicate that not all courts are yet willing
to adopt the principles of apportionment, still there is cause to hope
for those who feel that equity requires such apportionment and yet
who feel strongly that statutes should be avoided in these matters because no statute can hope adequately to encompass the myriad possible
situations involving those principles. In those states where no decisions have yet been handed down, several points may be brought to
a court's attention in the reasonable belief that they may affect its decision. Initially, equitable considerations are always persuasive, and it
may be strongly argued that the imposition of a federal estate tax burden upon residuary legatees with respect to property in all likelihood
never given a thought by the testator is contrary to all equitable considerations. Secondly, it should be noticed that the recent decisions denying apportionment have done so largely on a citation of the "majority
rule," whereas those requiring apportionment have set forth reasons
at some length. The effect of the Del Drago decision on the rationale
of the early non-apportionment cases cannot be overlooked, and, :finally,
while the courts of Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, Washington, and perhaps Illinois, have denied
apportionment, public policy has thereupon caused the enactment of
some kind of apportionment statute in all of those states except Minnesota, Washington and Illinois. If this is the tren_d of public policy,
surely an alert court should.recognize it instead of setting itself against
the tide and forcing legislative action to overrule its decisions.
90for example, Hughes v. Sun Life Assur. Co., (7th Cir. 1946) 159 F. (2d) 110
at 114, contains the statement: "In the absence of statutory enactment directing otherwise,
the federal tax must be considered as a charge against the whole of the estate and not
against the individual shares," citing the Hart case. More recently, an Illinois Appellate
Court, in Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson, 344 ill. App. 508, 101 N.E. (2d) 604 (1951),
quoted the above-quoted language from the Hart decision and stated, at 515: '"We do not
think the rule laid down in this last case upon the question here involved was dictum,
but even if it was, it was the expression of opinion upon a point in a case deliberately
passed upon by the court •• .' (Italics ours.)" Both these decisions involved questions
distinguishable from the apportionment problems under consideration here. Nonetheless,
their acceptance of the principle of law stated in the Hart case cannot be disputed. It should
also be noted that Fleming, "Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes," 43 !LI.. L. RBv.
153 (1948), stated it to be his opinion that, while apportionment might be justified on
equitable grounds, it was unlikely to prevail in illinois.

